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FIRURE 2.1 GREEN HOUSE EFFECT: GLOBAL WARMING
SPACE
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3.0 CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS 
Indeed, development that is socially economically and environmentally 
sustainable is a challenge, even without global warming. Thus, sustainable 
development can be defined as development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. 
That is, unmitigated climate change is incompatible with sustainable 
development. However, climate change is costly (whatever the policy chosen). 
Thus, spending less on mitigation will mean spending more on adaptation and 
accepting greater damages. Here, the cost of action must be compared with the 
cost of inaction. Unfortunately, this comparison is complex because of the 
considerable uncertainty about the technologies that will be available in the 
future, the ability of societies and ecosystems to adapt; the extent of damages 
that higher greenhouse gas concentrations will cause; and the temperatures that 
might constitute thresholds or tipping points beyond which catastrophic impacts 
occur. 
                      Consequently, economists have typically tried to identify the optimal 
climate policy using cost- benefit analysis. However, these results are sensitive 
to the particular assumptions about the remaining uncertainties and to the 
normative choices made regarding distributional and measurements issues. Thus, 
economists continue to disagree on the economically or socially optimal carbon 
trajectory. Yet, the advocates of a more gradual reduction in emissions conclude 
that the optimal target (the one that will produce the lowest total cost) could be 
well above 3oC (Nordhaus, 2008). Indeed, the large uncertainties about the 
potential losses associated with climate change and the possibility of catastrophic 
risks may well justify earlier and more aggressive action than a simple cost-
benefit analysis would suggest. This incremental amount could be thought of as 
the insurance premium to keep climate change within a safer band. 
In other words, spending less than half a percent of GDP as Climate  
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Insurance could well be a socially acceptable proposition. At present, the   world 
spends about three percent of global GDP on insurance. But beyond the question 
of climate insurance is the question of what might be the resulting mitigation 
costs and the associated financing needs. In the medium term, estimates of 
mitigation costs in developing countries range between $140 billion and $175 
billion annually by 2030. Table 3.1 shows that this represents the incremental 
costs relative to a business-as-usual scenario (World Bank, 2010). 
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TABLE 3.1 DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2030 (2% TRAJECTORY): 
  MITIGATION COST AND FINANCING NEEDS 
 
S/N MODEL 
MITIGATION 
COSTS 
FNANCING 
1 
IEA 
 (IEA, 2009) 
̶ 565 
2 
MACKINSEY 
(Mckinsey, 2009) 
175 563 
3 
MESSAGE 
(IIASA, 2009) 
̶ 264 
4 
MINICAM 
(Edmond, 2008) 
139 ̶ 
5 
REMIND 
(Knopf, 2010) 
̶ 384 
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However, financing needs will be higher as many of the savings from the lower 
operating costs associated with renewable energy and energy efficiency gains 
only materialize overtime. Unfortunately, financing has historically been a 
constraint in developing countries, resulting in under investment in infrastructure 
as well as a bias toward energy choices with lower upfront capital costs (even 
when such choices eventually result in higher overall costs). Yet, in the longer 
term, mitigation costs and income will increase overtime to cope with growing 
population and energy needs.  
Table 3.2 shows that the present value of global mitigation costs to 2100 is 
expected to remain well below one percent of global GDP with estimates ranging 
between 0.3 percent and 0.7 percent (World Bank, 2010). However, developing 
countries mitigation costs represents a higher share of their own GDP (ranging 
between 0.5% and 1.2%). While few still debates the need for action to mitigate 
climate change, controversy remains over how much and how soon to mitigate. 
In fact, holding the changes in global average temperatures below dangerous 
levels would require immediate and global actions (actions that are costly) to 
reduce emissions from projected levels by 50 to 80 percent by 2050. Yet, the 
economic assessments of climate change policies must factor in the uncertainties 
about the size and timing of adverse impacts and about the feasibility, cost, and 
time profiles of mitigation efforts. Here, a key uncertainty missed by most 
economic models is the possibility of large catastrophic events related to climate 
change. In fact, the underlying probability distribution of such catastrophic risks 
is unknown and will likely remain so. Surely, more aggressive mitigation almost 
will reduce their likelihood (though very difficult to assess by how much). Thus, 
the possibility of a global catastrophic (even one with very low probability) 
should increase society’s willingness to pay for faster and more aggressive 
mitigation to the extent that it helps to avoid calamity. 
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TABLE 3.2   GLOBAL 2100: 
            PRESENT VALUE MITIGATION COSTS (% OF GDP) 
 
S/N MODELS WORLD 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
1 
DICE 
 (Nordhaus, 2008) 
0.7 ̶ 
2 
FAIR 
(Hof, 2008) 
0.6 ̶ 
3 
MESSAGE 
(IIASA, 2008) 
0.3 0.5 
4 
MINICAM 
(Edmond, 2008) 
0.7 1.2 
5 
PAGE 
(Hope, 2009) 
0.4 0.9 
6 
REMIND 
(Knopf, 2010) 
0.4 ̶ 
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Even without considering these catastrophic risks, substantial uncertainties 
remain around climate change’s ecological and economic impacts. Again, the 
likely pace and ultimate magnitude of warming is unknown. That is, how 
changes in climate variability and extremes (not just changes in mean 
temperature) will affect natural systems and human well being is uncertain. 
These uncertainties only increase with the pace and amount of warming. And 
greater uncertainty requires adaptation strategies that can cope with many 
different climates and outcomes. Such strategies exist but they are less efficient 
than strategies that could be designed with perfect knowledge. Therefore, 
uncertainty is costly and more uncertainty increase costs. Without inertia and 
irreversibility, uncertainty would not matter so much; because decisions would 
be reversed and adjustments would be smooth and costless. But tremendous 
inertia (in the climate system, in the built environment, in the behavior of 
individuals, in the behavior of institutions) make it costly, if not impossible; to 
adjust in the direction of more stringent mitigation if new information is 
revealed or new technologies are slow to be discovered.  
 
 Consequently, inertia greatly increases the potential negative implications 
of climate policy decisions under uncertainty. And uncertainty combined with 
inertia and irreversibility argues for greater precautionary mitigation. In other 
words, the economics of decision making under uncertainty makes a case that 
uncertainty about the effects of climate change calls for more rather than less 
mitigation. 
 
           Despite the global economic chaos, the case for urgent action against 
climate change remains. And it becomes more pressing given the increase in 
poverty and vulnerability around the world. Thus, recent public debates have 
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focused on the possibility of using fiscal packages to push for a greener 
economy, combating climate change while restoring growth. 
In other words, how can both the economic slump and climate change be 
tackled with the fiscal stimulus? Investment in climate policy can therefore  
be an efficient way to deal with the economic crisis in the short term. 
Yet, incorporating sound low-carbon and high resilience components in  
fiscal expansions to combat the financial crisis will not be enough to thwart the 
long-term.  
 
 Therefore, fundamental transformations are needed in social protection, 
in carbon finance, in research and development, in energy markets as well as in 
the management of land and water. Over the medium and long-terms, the 
challenge is to find new paths to reach the twin goals of sustaining development 
and limiting climate change. Clearly, reaching an equitable and fair global deal 
would be an important step toward avoiding worst-case scenarios. But it 
requires transforming the carbon—intensive lifestyle of developed countries and 
the carbon—intensive growth paths of develop countries. Consequently, 
modifications in social norms that reward a low-carbon lifestyle could prove a 
powerful element of success. But behavioral change needs to be matched with 
institutional reform, additional finance and technological innovation to avoid 
irreversible, catastrophic increases in temperature. And for dealing with climate 
change, additional climate — smart regulation is needed to induce innovative   
approaches to mitigation and adaptation. Indeed, such policies create an opening 
for the scale and scope of government interventions needed to correct climate 
change, which perhaps, is the biggest market failure in human history. 
 Therefore, an effective international climate regime must integrate 
development concerns, breaking free of the environment-versus-equity 
dichotomy. In other words, a multi track framework for climate action (with 
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different goals or polices for developed and developing countries) may be one 
way to move forward. Certainly, this framework would need to consider the 
process for defining and measuring success in the global context. Clearly, 
promising initiatives are emerging but applying them on the necessary scale will 
require money, effort, ingenuity and information. 
  With the global economy set to quadruple by mid-century, energy-related 
carbon dioxide emission would (on current trends) more than double, putting 
the world onto a potentially catastrophic trajectory that could lead to 
temperatures more than 5oC warmer than in preindustrial times. In order to limit 
warming to 2oC, global emissions would have to peak no later than 2020 and the 
decline by 50 - 80 percent from today’s levels by 2050, with further reductions 
continuing to 2100 and beyond. Delaying actions by 10years would make it 
impossible to reach this goal. Therefore, the inertia in energy capital stocks 
means that investments over the next decade will largely determine emissions 
through 2050 and beyond. Unfortunately, delays would lock the world into high 
carbon infrastructure and later requiring costly retrofitting and premature 
scrapping of existing capital stocks. Indisputably and economically, the time for 
action is now. 
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4.0 AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
 Africa is the second largest of the earth’s continents, covering about 30, 
330,000 Sq Km (including its adjacent Islands). Geographically, the African 
continent is characterized by Plateau Land, with a few distinct mountain ranges 
and a narrow coastal plain. It is commonly divided along the lines of the Sahara 
Desert (world’ largest desert) which cuts a huge swath through the northern half 
of the continent while the countries north of the Sahara make up the region of 
North Africa. Indeed, Africa has a proud (noble) history and it is widely 
believed that human life began in Africa. However, the last five hundred years 
in Africa have been dominated the by foreign colonization, political and ethnic 
struggles that have hampered Socio—industrial development. In fact the 
continent remains rural and it is the least developed of any continent after 
Antarctica. Although, agricultural is the main economic activity in Africa, 
devastating famine (disease outbreaks) are common. Yet, Africa is rich in 
natural resources; and part of its economic base is the export of this wealth. 
 
Naturally, the African climate (more than that of any other continent) is 
generally uniform.  
This observation results from the position of the continent in the tropical zone; 
the impact of cool ocean currents; and the absence of mountain chains (serving 
as climatic barriers). While several Africa climatic zones can be distinguished, 
Africa vegetation can be classified according to rainfall and climate zones. On 
one hand, the tropical rain forest (where the average rain is more than 1270mm) 
has a dense surface covering  of shrubs, ferns, and mosses (above which tower 
evergreens)  oil palms, and numerous species of tropical hardwood trees. On the 
other hand, a mountain forest zone (with average annual rainfall only slightly 
less than in the tropical rain forests) is found in the high mountains of Africa. 
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Fortunately, Africa is very rich in mineral resources, possessing most of the 
known mineral types of the world. In fact, many of these minerals are found in 
significant quantities (although with uneven geographic distribution). Apart 
from the abundant fossil fuels, major deposits of coal, petroleum, and natural 
gas exists. Other important minerals include gold, diamonds, copper, bauxite, 
manganese, nickel, platinum, cobalt, radium, germanium, lithium, titanium, 
phosphates, ore, chromium, tin, zinc, lead, thorium, zirconium, vanadium, 
antimony, beryllium, clays, mica, sulfur, salt, natron, graphite, limestone, and 
gypsum.  
Traditionally, the vast majority of Africans have been farmers and 
herders who raised crops and livestock for subsistence. Here, manufacturing and 
crafts are carried on as part—time activities while industrial specialization, 
communication networks and elaborate governmental structures maintained the 
flow of commerce. Although, a number of Africa States have considerable 
natural resources, few have the finances to develop their economics. However, 
foreign private enterprise has often regarded investment in such underdeveloped 
areas as too risky. Yet the major alternative sources of financing are national 
and multinational lending institutions. Indeed, expectations in African nations 
for a better living standard have increased; and the prices of consumer and other 
manufactured goods have kept pace but the prices of most African primary 
products have lagged behind. 
Regrettably, a worldwide recession in the early1980s multiplied difficulties that 
were initiated by the oil—price increases of the 1970s. In fact, serious foreign—
exchange problems and ballooning foreign debt aggravated public discontent. 
Consequently, famine and drought plagued the northern and central regions and 
many refugees left their homes in search of food (thereby increasing the 
problems of the host countries). 
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Again, in the late 1980’s and 1990’s, protracted Local conflicts in some parts of 
the continent destabilized governments, halted economic progress and cost  the 
lives of thousands of Africans. Yet, Africa has experienced solid improvement 
in economic performance in the recent years. The continent as a whole grew 
(statistically) at an average rate of 5.7% in 2006 and 5.8% in 2007 in real terms, 
up from an average of 3.4% in the 1998—2002 years (United Nations, 2009). 
Notably, the impressive growth since the beginning of the 21st century (its 
economics ability to weather the storm of the recent crisis and the resumption of 
growth by nearly all countries in 2010) suggest that Africa is one of the world’s 
emerging economic powers. However, Africa’s momentum slowed in 2011 
(weighed down by contraction of economic activity in North Africa) due to 
political unrest as well as global economic and financial crisis. Yet, growth 
prospects remain optimistic, with output for the continent as a whole expected 
to recover strongly in 2012 and beyond. 
Despite the observed accelerated growth in Africa over the past decade, 
progress in social development remains slow.  
Regrettably, the experienced rapid economic growth has not translated into 
commensurate reductions in poverty and hunger in Africa (United Nations 
2012). 
 Clearly, ensuring environmental sustainability has a great impact on 
reaching most of the other goals. In other words, preserving and properly 
managing the environment is an essential foundation for sustainable 
development and poverty reduction. In particular, emissions of CO2 per capita 
are an important indicator in assessing progress towards environmental 
sustainability and climate change. Unfortunately, Africa is very vulnerable to 
climate change given its low capacity to respond and adapt; but the continent 
emits quite little greenhouse gas relative both to its population and to other 

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regions. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and, 4.4 shows the comparative picture of the 
emission intensities (impacts) in Africa as well as the rest of the world. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4.1 COMPARATIVE ENERGY RELATED EMISSIONS: 
AFRICAN DATA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  
CO2 
EMISSIONS 
ANNUAL 
TOTAL 
MILLIONS 
METRIC 
TONS 
CO2 
EMISSIONS 
PER 
CAPITA 
METRIC 
TONS 
CO2 
EMISSIONS 
PER 
CAPITA 
METRIC 
TONS 
CO2 
EMISSI-
ONS 
ANNUAL 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
PERCEN-
TAGE 
SHARE 
CUMULA-
TIVE 
EMISSIONS 
CO2 
EMISSIONS 
BILLION 
METRIC 
TONS  
TOTAL 
PRIMARY 
ENERGY 
SUPPLY 
MILLION TONS 
(OIL) 
S/N COUNTRIES 1990 2005 2007 1990 2005 2005 1850–2005  1990 2006 
1 ALGERIA 68 91 4.1 2.7 2.8 0.34 2.8 23.9 36.7 
2 ANGOLA — — 1.4 — — — — 6.3 10.3 
3 BENIN — — 0.5 — — — — 1.7 2.8 
4 BOTSWANA — — — — — — — 1.3 2.0 
5 BURKIN-
AFASO 
— — 0.1 — — — — — — 
6 BURUNDI — — 0.0 — — — — — — 
7 CAMEROON — — 0.3 — — — — 5.0 7.1 
8 CAPE VERDE — — — — — — — — — 
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9 CENTRAL 
AFRICA REP. 
— — 0.1 — — — — — — 
10 CHAD — — 0.0 — — — — — — 
11 COMOS — — — — — — — — — 
12 CONGO REP. — — 0.4 — — — — 0.9 1.2 
13 CONGO 
DEM. REP. 
— — 0.0 — — — — 11.9 17.5 
14 COTE 
D’IVOIRE 
— — 0.3 — — — — 4.4 7.3 
15 DJIBOUTI — — — — — — — — — 
16 EGYPT 81 149 2.3 1.5 2.0 0.56 3.2 32.0 62.5 
17 EQUATORIA
L GUINEA 
— — — — — — — — — 
18 ERITREA — — 0.1 — — — — — 0.7 
19 ETHIOPIA — — 0.1 — — — — 15.0 22.3 
20 GABON — — — — — — — 1.2 1.8 
21 GAMBIA — — — — — — — — — 
22 GHANA — — 0.4 — — — — 5.3 9.5 
23 GUINEA — — 0.1 — — — — — — 
24 GUINEA 
BISSAU 
— — — — — — — — — 
25 KENYA — — 0.3 — — — — 11.2 17.9 
26 LESOTHO — — — — — — — — — 
27 LIBERIA — — 0.2 — — — — — — 
28 LIBYAN 
ARAB JAM 
37 47 9.3 8.4 7.9 0.18 1.3 11.5 17.8 
29 MADAGASCAR — — 0.1 — — — — — — 
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30 MALAWI — — 0.1 — — — — — — 
31 MALI — — 0.0 — — — — — — 
32 MAURITANIA — — 0.6 — — — — — — 
33 MAURITIUS — — — — — — — — — 
34 MAYOTTE — — — — — — — — — 
35 MOROCCO 20 41 1.5 0.8 1.4 0.16 0.9 7.2 14.0 
36 MOZAMBIQUE — — 0.1 — — — — 6.0 8.8 
37 NAMIBIA — — — — — — — 
 
— 1.5 
38 NIGER — — 0.1 — — — — — — 
39 NIGERIA 68 97 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.36 2.3 70.9 105.1 
40 REUNION — — — — — — — — — 
41 RWANDA — — 0.1 — — — — — — 
42 SAINT 
HELEN 
— — — — — — — — — 
43 SAOTME 
PRINCIPE 
— — — — — — — — — 
44 SENEGAL — — 0.5 — — — — 1.8 3.0 
45 SEYCHELLES — — — — — — — — — 
46 SIERRA 
LEONE 
— — 0.2 — — — — — — 
47 SOMALIA — — — — — — — — — 
48 SOUTH 
AFRICA 
255 331 9.0 7.2 7.1 1.25 14.1 91.2 129.8 
49 SUDAN — — 0.3 — — —  10.7 17.7 
50 SOUTH 
SUDAN 
— — — — — — — — — 
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51 SWAZILAND — — — —  — — — — 
52 TANZANIA — — 0.1 — — — — 9.8 20.8 
53 TOGO — — 0.2 —  — — 1.3 2.4 
54 TUNISIA — — 2.3 —  — — 5.1 8.7 
55 UGANDA — — 0.1 —  — — — — 
56 WESTERN 
SAHARA 
— — — —  — — — — 
57 ZAMBIA — — 0.2 — — — — 5.5 7.3 
58 ZIMBABWE — — 0.8 — — — — 9.4 9.6 
59 LOW 
INCOME 
549 70.7 0.3 0.7 0.6 2.66 24.0 400.2 575.5 
60 HIGH 
INCOME 
10999 13207 12.5 11.8 12.7 49.75 750.1 4479.4 5659.1 
61 WORLD 20693 26544 4.6 4.0 4.2 100.00 1169.1 8637.3 11525.2 
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TABLE 4.2: CARBON INTENSITY AND NON-CO2 EMISSIONS: 
COMPARATIVE DATA 
 
1 2 3 4 
  
NON-CO2  EMISSIONS 
ANNUAL   TOTAL 
METRICTONS EQUIVALENT 
(MILLIONS) 
CARBON INTENSITY 
ENERGY METRICTONS:  CO2 
PERTON OIL EQUIVALENT 
S/N COUNTRIES 1990 2005 1990 2005 
1 NIGERIA 9.6 15.5 2.86 2.63 
2 EGYPT 8.5 16.0 2.54 2.43 
3 LIBYA ̶ ̶ 3.16 2.65 
4 MOROCCO ̶ ̶ 2.72 3.08 
5 NIGERIA 25.8 66.2 0.95 0.92 
6 SOUTH AFRICA 10.6 12.5 2.79 2.59 
7 LOW INCOME 115.5 256.4 1.38 1.26 
8 MIDDLE INCOME 1168.3 1279.4 2.41 2.49 
9 HIGH INCOME 577.2 557.1 2.44 2.32 
10 WORLD 1861.0 1978.9 2.39 2.35 
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TABLE 4.3: LAND-BASED EMISSIONS: CO2 (DEFORESTATION BASED) 
AND CH4/N2O (AGRIC BASED) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TOTAL EMISSIO
NS 
ANNUAL AVER
AGE 
METRICTONS 
   
 
PER CAPITA 
EMISSIONS 
ANNUAL 
AVERAGE 
METRICTONS 
PER       RANK 
AVERAGE  
SHARE  TOTA
L EMISSIONS 
PERCENTAGE 
% 
 
 
 
ANNUAL 
TOTAL  CO2 
EQUIVALENT  
METRICTONS 
MILLIONS 
 
 
 
SHARE OF 
TOTAL % 
 
 
 
 
PER CAPITA
CO
EQUIVALENT 
METRICTONS 
 
 
 
 
MILLIO
NS 
RANK PER RANK 
S/N COUNTRIES 
1990-
2005    
 
1990-
2050 
 2000-2050 
2000-
2050 
 2000-2050 
1990
1 CAMEROON 70 12 3.9 18 1.2 — — — 
2 
CONGO DEM. REP 
OF 
176 04 3.0 24 3.1 36 75 1.2 0.9
3 ETHOPIA — — — — — 39 55 0.9 0.8
4 NIGERIA 158 05 1.1 40 2.8 75 115 1.9 0.8
5 TANZANIA 51 19 1.3 35 0.9 — — — 
6 ZAMBIA 106 09 9.3 06 1.9 — — — 
7 ZIMBABWE 40 22 3.1 22 0.7 — — — 
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TABLE 4.4 2050: PROJECTED CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACT IN AFRICA 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PHYSICAL  
IMPACTS 
CHANGE 
IN 
TERMPERA
TURE OC 
PHYSICAL 
IMPACTS 
CHANGE  
IN HEAT 
 WAVE  
DURATION
 NO 
OF DAYS  
PHYSICAL  
IMPACTS  
PRECIPTA-
TION  
% CHANGE  
PHYSICAL  
IMPACTS 
PRECIPITA-
TION 
INTENSITY  
% CHANGE 
 
 
AGRIC  
IMPACTS 
AGRIC 
OUTPUT % 
CHANGE 
 
 
  AGRIC 
 IMPACTS 
 AGRIC 
 YIELD % 
CHANGE  
 
S/N COUNTRIES 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 2000-2050 
1 ALGERIA 1.9 22.2 -4.9 7.2 36.0 -6.7 
2 
BURKINA 
FASO 
1.4 5.7 0.3 0.0 -24.3 -4.4 
3 CAMEROON 1.3 2.0 0.9 3.0 -20.0 -6.6 
4 
CONDO DEM  
REP 
1.4 2.0 0.8 3.1 -14.7 -7.0 
5 COTE DIVORE 1.3 1.9 -0.3 -0.2 14.3 -12.9 
6 
EGYPT ARABA
 REP OF 
1.6 14.7 7.0 -1.6 11.3 -27.9 
7 ETHPOPIA 1.4 3.1 2.4 5.0 -31.3 0.5 
8 GHANA 1.3 1.3 1.0 0.8 -14.0 -10.1 
9 KENYA 1.2 2.5 7.5 8.0 -5.5 6.1 
10 MALAWI 1.4 7.5 -0.1 2.4 -31.3 -3.0 
11 MALI 1.7 16.1 8.4 3.8 -35.6 -9.6 
12 MOROCCO 2.1 21.1 -16.8 5.3 -39.0 25.2 
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13 MOZABIQUE 1.3 5.9 -2.7 1.4 -21.7 -10.4 
14 NIGER 1.6 16.1 5.6 2.5 -34.1 -1.7 
15 NIGERIA 1.3 4.1 0.6 1.1 -18.5 -9.9 
16 SENEGAL 1.6 6.0 -1.9 3.1 -51.9 -19.3 
17 
SOUTH 
AFRICA 
1.5 9.5 -4.5 1.4 -33.4 -5.2 
18 SUDAN 1.6 9.5 -0.6 -0.1 -56.1 -7.0 
19 TANZANIA 1.3 2.3 4.4 6.0 -24.2 -2.0 
20 TO GO 1.3 1.5 -2.0 -0.5 — -14.0 
21 UGANDA 1.3 1.7 3.4 6.6 -16. 8 -5.0 
22 ZAMBIA 1.5 8.1 0.6 3.9 -39. 6 1.3 
23 ZIMBABWE 1.5 12.3 -3.7 4.8 -37.9 -10.6 

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From the above tables, the carbon dioxide emissions annual total (million metric 
tons) is the total CO2  emission from the energy sector, including electricity 
(heat) production, manufacturing, construction, gas flaring, transportation, and 
other industries (WRI, 2008; world bank, 2010). 
However, emissions from industrial processes (primarily cement production) 
that amounts to approximately four percent of global energy—related CO2 
emissions are not included. The carbon dioxide emissions change (%) is the 
percentage change in energy—related CO2 emissions between 1990 (base year) 
and 2005. The carbon dioxide emissions per capita (metric tons) is the annual 
emissions divided by midyear population and expressed in tons of CO2 per 
person. Again the carbon dioxide emission share of world total (%) is the share 
of worlds total energy—related CO2 emissions attributed to a given country, 
income group or region. Similarly, the carbon dioxide emissions cumulative 
since 1850 (billion metric tons) is the cumulative CO2 emissions between 1850 
and 2005. Here, the sources of emissions include combustion of solid, liquid 
and gaseous fuels as well as cement production and gas flaring (DOE, 2009). 
In contrast, the annual total none—CO2 emissions (million tons of CO2     
equivalents) are the total methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions in 
CO2 equivalent from the energy sector. This indicator includes emissions from 
biomass combustion; oil and natural gas systems, coal mining and other 
stationary and mobile sources. Here, the CO2 equivalent expresses the quantity 
of a mixture of greenhouse gases in terms of the quantity of CO2 that would 
produce the same amount of warming as would the mixture of gases. Yet, the 
carbon intensity of energy (metric tons of CO2 per ton of oil equivalent) is the 
ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to energy production; and this ratio measures 
the greenness of energy production that is expressed in tons of CO2 per ton of 
oil equivalents. On the other hand, the carbon intensity of income (metric tons 
of CO2 per thousand PPP &of GDP) is the ratio of carbon dioxide emissions to 
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gross domestic product; and this measure is an indicator of the greenness of the 
economy that is expressed in tons of CO2 per 1000 PPP dollars of GDP (WRI, 
2008; IEA, 2008a; IEA, 2008b, World bank, 2010). 
 In general, carbon dioxide emissions are those stemming from the 
burning of fossil fuels and the manufacture of cement and include carbon 
dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels (flaring) 
divided by midyear population. As a land—based emission, CO2 emission 
estimates due to deforestation are derived from estimates of tropical forest cover 
change by the year 2005 (Houghton, 2009; FAO, 2005). 
However, estimates of CO2 emissions from deforestation vary across time as 
well as a result of uncertain data. In   fact, there is a variation among estimates 
of deforestation rates and estimates of carbon stocks in the forests converted to 
other uses. Here, to accounts for year—to—year trends and measurement 
uncertainty, the numbers reported are based on average annual emissions 
between 1990 and 2005. Yet the rank is based on the average annual emission 
for the period 1990 to 2005. Again, the per capita CO2 emissions (metric tons) 
is the annual average emissions from deforestation divided by midyear 
population expressed in tons of CO2 per person while the ranking of per capita 
emissions is based on the sampled countries. Similarly, the average share of 
world total (%) is the share of CO2 emissions based on average annual 
emissions between 1990 and 2005 as a percentage of global emissions due to 
deforestation. As a non-CO2 emissions from agriculture, total methane and 
nitrous oxide are measured in CO2 equivalent; which expressed the quantity of a 
mixture of greenhouse gases in terms of the quantity of CO2 that would produce 
the same amount of warming as would the mixture of gases. Indeed, emissions 
in the agricultural sector result primarily from rice cultivation, agricultural soils, 
manure management and enteric fermentation (belching) from live stock. 
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The share of the world total (%) is the share of world total emissions from the 
agriculture sector attributed to a given country or a region. Here, per capita 
emissions (million metric tons of CO2 equivalent) is the annual emissions from 
the agriculture sector divided by midyear population  in 1990 and 2005 
expressed in tons of CO2 equivalent per person. On the other hand, per capita 
emissions rank is based on the sampled countries. As indicated, total primary 
energy supply (TPES) as a measure of commercial energy consumption, is the 
sum of indigenous production, imports, and stock changes, minus exports and 
international marine bunkers. Clearly, a lower share of fossil fuels and higher 
share of renewable sources in TPES is an indicator of countries path toward a 
green economy. 
  The projected physical impacts indicator is the projected physical 
impacts of climate change by the middle of the 21st century. Here, the selected 
indicators include change in average annual temperature; change in precipitation 
and precipitation intensity as well as change in heat wave duration. In fact, these 
projections estimates represent an ensemble mean of nineteen general 
circulation models used for the intergovernmental panel on climate change 
fourth Assessment. Clearly, the changes are estimated for the future time period 
2030—2049 relative to 1980—1999; and these indicators are spatially weighted 
averages for each country. On the other hand, the projected agricultural impacts 
are the percentage change in agricultural output (defined as revenue per nature) 
between 2000 and 2080 based on preferred estimates (cline, 2007). Here, the 
impacts in agricultural yield are defined as an average percentage change in 
crop yields, between 2000 and 2050 for wheat, rice, maize, millet, field pea, 
sugar beet, sweet potato, soybean, groundnut, sun flower, and rapeseed. 
 Concerning consumption of ozone—depleting substances, the majority of 
Africa countries are on the right track. As shown in table 4.5, this indicator 
marks the commitment to reducing carbon dioxide emissions and progress in 
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phasing out the consumption of ozone—depleting substances (such as chloro 
fluoro carbons) by countries that have ratified the Montreal protocol of 1987 
(United Nations, 2012). Indeed, the majority of African countries has committed 
to full compliance with the protocol and has reduced consumption of ozone—
depleting substances for instance, in Zimbabwe, one of the contributing factors 
to the reduction in ozone—depleting substances was a total phase—out of 
methyl bromide in the tobacco, grain fumigation and horticulture industries. 
However, some countries have increased their consumption of ozone depleting 
substance (owning to weak regulatory measures) and need to take steps to 
reverse this trend. Fortunately, some African countries have developed a new 
policy tool (informal prior informed consent mechanism) that will help 
strengthen the enforcement of countries system for the licensing imports of 
ozone depleting substance (UNE P, 2011). 



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5.0 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Conceptually, the alternative views of the relationship between the 
environment and the economy has led to the evolution of the new policy 
concepts of the ‘green economy’ and ‘green growth’. Yet there are no consensus 
views on these terms and meaning. However, UNEP (2011) defines a green 
economy as one which is low- carbon, resource- efficient and socially inclusive. 
In other words, a green economy is one that results in improved human well-
being and social equity while significantly reducing environmental risks and 
ecological scarcities. In fact, green growth can be regarded as a subset of the 
idea of sustainable development (narrower in scope) entailing an operational 
policy agenda that can help achieve concrete (measurable) progress at the 
interface between economy and environment (DECD, 2011). In general, 
sustainable development has been defined as development that meets the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs. But such development rests on three pillars: economic growth, 
social equity and environmental sustainability. In contrast, the concepts of green 
economy and green growth place greater emphasis on the potential synergies 
between economic growth and environmental sustainability. Against this 
background, more attention need to be given to the nature of the relationship 
between the economy and the environment (the way in which such relationship 
evolves during the process of economic development) and the implications of 
that evolving relationship for the policy challenge of promoting development 
and poverty reduction in countries at different levels and stages of development 
in Africa. 
 Analytically, we attempt to build a developmental approach to the 
relationship between the economy and the environment. As a starting point, we 
assume as a starting point that the economy is best viewed as a subsystem of the 
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earth-system and then considers how (within this vision) resource use and 
environmental impacts change during the economic development process. 
Essentially, this provides the basis for a strategic approach to sustainable 
development; which builds on the imperative of structural transformation for 
accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction (UNCTAD, 2012). Thus, 
the major views of the dynamics of development, resource use and 
environmental impacts are summarized as follows: IPAT equation, 
Environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis and socio-ecological metabolism 
(structural change). In fact, these views constitute a valuable framework to 
comprehend where countries at different levels of development stand in relation 
to their current and future use of natural resources and levels of environmental 
impact. Empirically, the World Bank’s environmental impact and sustainability 
applied general equilibrium (ENVISAGE) model is designed to analyze a 
variety of issues related to the economics of climate change (Mensbrugghe, 
2008). These issues include baseline emissions of CO2 and other green house 
gases; impacts of climate change on the economy; adaptation by economic 
agents to climate change; greenhouse gas mitigation policies (taxes, caps and 
trade); role of land use in future emissions and mitigation; and distributional 
consequences of climate change impacts, adaptation and mitigation (at national 
and household level). Constructively, ENVISAGE is intended to be flexible in 
terms of its dimensions and the core database (that includes energy volumes and 
CO2 emissions) is the global trade analysis project (GTAP) data base.  Here, it 
divides the word into 113 countries and regions. The data base also divides 
global production into 57 sectors with extensive details for agriculture and food 
as well as energy (coal mining, crude oil production, natural gas production, 
refined oil, electricity, and distributed natural gas). Generally, the ENVISAGE 
model includes the following:  
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1. Capital vintage production technology that permits analysis of the 
flexibility of economies, 
2. Detailed specification of energy demand in each economy, 
3. Ability to introduce future alternative energy (or backstop) technologies, 
4. CO2 emission that are fuel and demand specific,   
5. Flexible system for incorporating any combination of carbon taxes, 
emission caps and trade able permits; 
6. Simplified climate module that links greenhouse gas to greenhouse gas 
emissions to atmospheric concentrations combined with a carbon cycle 
that leads to radioactive forcing and temperature changes, 
7. Splitting of electricity into nuclear, hydro, renewable, etc. 
8. Resource depletion module for coal, oil and gas, 
9. Other greenhouse gases (such as agric-linked) 
10. More detailed land-use module, and  
11. Additional alternative technologies 
 Specifically, the model blocks include production, income, demand, 
expenditures, fuels, trade, product market equilibrium, factor market 
equilibrium, macro closure, climate module and model dynamics. 
 For the climate module’s sequence, total emissions are derived and these 
lead to atmospheric concentrations (emissions directly add to the atmosphere) 
but concentrations in the atmosphere also interact with the ocean, creating a 
dynamic process that would continue even in the absence of emissions. Clearly, 
the atmospheric concentration has an impact on radiative forcing, that is, how 
much of the sun’s energy is reflected back to space. Thus, there is a set of 
equations that links radiative forcing to temperature and these relations also 
contain an interaction with the ocean.  
 
 
 


 
 
Here, these relevant equations are  
Specified as follows: 
 
 
         (5.1) 
 
        (5.2) 
 
    I     (5.3) 
                 
Equation (5.1) determines the level of emissions (EMI) of type em for each unit 
of consumption of commodity i by agent aa (which covers all production 
activities and final demand accounts). Obviously, it is a fixed coefficient with 
respect to the demand level. Equation (5.2) defines the aggregate emission by 
region (or country). It is the double sum over all agents and inputs, with the 
possibility of an additional exogenous level of emissions (EMIOth). As shown 
by the equation (5.3) EMIGbl is the final summation across all countries and 
regions (with an additional exogenous component accounted for in the regional 
models). Notably, EMIGbl is indexed by z (which includes the different sinks 
for emissions. These modeled sinks include the atmosphere (atmos), the shallow 
oceans (upocn) and the deep oceans (dpocn). Clearly, all emissions CO2 
emissions are emitted to the atmosphere. Specifically, these three sinks are 
indexed by z; and for each period, there is a flow of carbon across the three 
sinks using a 3 x 3 transition matrix (K). Here, each column of the transition 
matrix represents the share of the stock in the sink that flows to a different sink. 
Thus, the diagonal element represents the share of the stock that stays in its own 
sink. The relevant equations are specified as follows: 
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      Concz              =   K.Concz,-1+(12/44).EMIGblz,CO2,-1                    (5.4) 
 
     Forcatmos = fCO2x, log10 (Concatmos/ConcPI) + ForcOth         (5.5) 
                      log10 (2) 
 
     Tempzt       = T.Tempzt, -1    +   Θ.Forcezt                                       (5.6) 
 
Equation (5.4) determines the concentration level in each sink and the 
concentration level is equal to its lagged value (multiplied by the transition 
matrix). In the absence of new emissions, one can determine the long-term 
equilibrium by multiplying the matrix kn-times, where n is large enough that the 
transition matrix converges towards a constant matrix. Carbon emissions are 
entirely added to atmospheric concentration and these emissions in the model 
are in terms of CO2, whereas concentrations and other relevant parameters are 
calibrated to carbon emissions. Thus, total CO2 emissions are multiplied by the 
factor (12/44) to convert CO2 to carbon. Again, equation (5.5) converts 
atmospheric concentrations to its impact on radiative forcing. This forcing is a 
logarithmic function (based 10) of concentration with two key parameters. The 
first is the pre-industrial concentration level (ConcPI) while the second is the 
amount of forcing induced by a doubling of concentration from its pre- 
industrial level (FCO2x). In fact, this relation allows for an exogenous amount of 
forcing that could eventually be negative (as is the current case) due to SO2 
emissions. Similarly, equation (5.6) provides the link between temperature in 
the two sinks with their previous respective temperatures through a transition 
matrix (ϑ ) and the incremental impact from forcing through the matrix (Θ). In 
fact, temperature measured as the increment to temperature in oC since1900 
(like concentration) has interactions between the atmosphere and the oceans. 
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Consequently, the ocean is treated as a single sink and the subset zt of z covers 
only atmos and dpocn.  
 Essentially there are a number of different potential regimes to limit 
carbon emission and the simplest is just to impose a carbon tax, that is set the 
variable ϑ emi to same value (measured as dollars per unit of emitted CO2). 
However, emission caps can be set on either a single region (country) basis, 
with a differentiated carbon tax across regions (countries) or on a region-wide 
basis with a uniform carbon tax. Here, quota regions are indexed by rq and can 
be assigned one or more countries. The relevant equations are presented as 
follows:  
 
        (5.7) 
 
        (5.8) 
 
         (5.9) 
         
        
Here, equation (5.7) implements emissions caps for each agglomeration of 
regions subject to a cap (potentially just single country) and the sum of 
emissions across all regions belong to region rq is capped to EMIcap. In fact, 
equation (5.7) determines the regional emissions tax (ϑ emiR) which will be 
uniform across all countries (regions) belonging to the aggregate region. Thus 
equation (5.8) is an accounting identity that equates the country (region) tax,    
ϑ emi , to the region-wide emissions tax . Yet, the shifter in equation (5.7) allows 
for additional targeting. Similarly, equation (5.9) determines the value of the 
trade in emissions quota when country or region specific quotas (EMIQuota) are 
allocated. Here, the value of the quota is the difference between the quota and 
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actual emissions (EMITot) valued at the emissions tax level. It is also assumed 
that the quota rents are recycled back to the government. 
 Empirically, the model dynamics are driven by three major factors as 
usually specified in most neo-classical growth models. The relevant equations 
are specified as follows: 
 
 
       (5.10) 
 
 
       (5.11) 
 
       (5.12) 
 
Here, population and labor force growth rates are exogenous and the labor force 
growth rate is equated to the growth rate of the working age population 
(between 15 and 64). The second factor is capital accumulation and the 
aggregate capital stock in any given year (KSTock) is equated to the previous 
year capital stock, less depreciation at a rate of δ, plus the previous period’s 
volume of investment, XCinv (as shown by equation 5-10). In fact, the latter is 
influenced by the national savings rate plus foreign savings as well as the unit 
cost of investment. Clearly, the aggregate capital stock variable takes two 
forms: KSTock (aggregate capital stock evaluated at fixed dollar prices) and 
XFT (normalized aggregate capital stock). Indeed, the normalized capital stock 
is equal to the tax inclusive base year capital remuneration, that is, the user cost 
of capital across sectors. It is normalized because its price is set to 1 in the base 
year while the ratio of the normalized capital stock to the actual capital stock 
provides a measure of the gross rate of return to capital. Here, it is assumed that 
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both measures of the capital stock grow at the same rate and hence equation 
(56.11) that equalizes the ration of the two measures. Again, the third factor is 
productivity and there are a number of productivity factors peppered throughout 
the model. Basically, the key productivity factor is 8f that corresponds to factor 
productivity. Clearly, there is a wedge between productivity in manufacturing 
and services that is represented by the factor Β in equation (5.12). Typically, it 
is assumed that productivity in manufacturing is greater than in services. That 
is, Β for manufacturing is positive and it is zero for services. Thus, in the 
calibration or business – as usual scenario, the uniform productivity factor (rl) is 
calibrated to achieve some target level of per capital growth (at least for some 
period) including historical validation from the base year to some current year 
and including some medium term horizon. 
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6.0 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Following Bussolo, et al (2008) some scenarios are derived with the use of 
ENVISAGE MODEL. In the standard business-as-usual scenario (reference or 
baseline), the key growth factors include labor and population growth, capital 
accumulation and productivity. 
The scenario assumes that all existing policies (such as energy prices and 
investment) remain in place as well as established link between temperature 
change and agricultural productivity. Yet, another scenario removes agricultural 
damages and thereby providing a measure of how important these might be on a 
regional scale. Again, the mitigation scenario assumes full participation and an 
efficient mechanism for reducing emissions through a globally applied uniform 
tax on carbon emissions. Here, all tax revenues are recycled internally and there 
is no cap or trade system that could lead to a re-allocation of tax revenues across 
countries. Regrettably, the base line scenario leads to a carbon concentration that 
rises from around 390 parts per million (PPM) in 2001 to 560ppm in 2050. 
Clearly, this was well above any stabilization scenario of 450ppm promoted by 
some as an upper limit to avoid severe damages or the more modest target of 
550ppm that many others perceive as a threshold not to surpass. As worrisome as 
the overall concentration level in 2050, the observed path was far from a 
stabilization scenario with concentrations likely to continue increasing well 
beyond 2050. In fact, the true objective was the overall rise in temperature that is 
driven by an increase in irradiative forcing given climate sensitivity rises to 
1.75oC relative to 1900 levels (IPCC, 2007). 
 In an attempt to measure the impacts of damages to agricultural 
productivity, other damages such as serve weather events, rising sea levels and 
increasing morbidity (mortality) were ignored. Here, the typical damage function 
has an economic variable that depends on temperature change as well as 
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potentially other climate-related variables such as water availability. These 
functions are typically non-linear as damages are assumed to rise rapidly after 
some threshold is reached. The reported ENVISAGE model implemented a 
linear damage function under the assumption that changes in temperature 
through 2050 are likely to be relatively mild and a linear function is a relatively 
good approximation. This damage function was specified as follows: 
   (6.1) 
   
     
Where δ is the impact productivity in region r and activity a while T is the global 
mean temperature. Here, the parameter α1 is taken from the estimates presented 
in Cline (2007) and represent the average percent decline in productivity when 
the global mean temperature reaches 2.5OC. On the other hand, the parameter,  
αo  is set to 1 so that in the absence of the damage estimate ( δ), the value 1 is 
taken. 
This damage estimate enters the production function (as a multiplicative factor to 
the productivity variable) of the following generic form: 
           (6.2) 
 
Where V is output (of activity a in region r); X is the vector of inputs (indexed 
by i), 8 is a set of efficiency productivity parameters); and a are the CES (primal) 
share coefficients. Specially, in the base year, all I parameters are initialized at I 
(but growing at some given geometric rate such as 2.25% per year). In fact, if all 
is equal to – 25%, then when the temperature increase reaches 2.5oC; the impact 
on productivity will be a 25 percent decline. Thus, table 6.1 provides estimated 
agricultural damages for the modeled Africa region while table 6.2 provides the 
comparative real income impacts of agricultural climate change damages. As a 
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methodological bench mark, the agro ecological model relies essentially on the 
physical and biological properties of growing crops. Essentially most crops have 
an inverts U-shape yield pattern where yields are low at some low temperature 
levels, increase until some optimum temperature, and then decline again as 
temperatures increase (for given water levels). Basically, these curves can be 
derived through experimentation from which can be derived the impact of 
temperature on crop-specific yields. In contrast, the Ricardian analysis takes a 
broader perspective on farm behavior and allows for adaptation to changes in the 
growing environment (water and temperature). Illustratively, if temperature 
increase has negative impacts on wheat yields; farmers will adapt and switch to 
grow more temperature tolerant crops such as corn. Thus, the impacts of water 
and temperature changes using Ricardian analysis are typically smaller than 
when using the agro ecological methodology. Yet increases in atmospheric 
carbon concentrations can be productivity enhancing as it improves the 
absorption of carbon by plants. In fact, in greenhouse experiments, this carbon 
fertilization effect has been shown to increase yields by up to fifteen percent. 
However, there is no consensus, how effective carbon fertilization is in the real 
world. Indeed, Cline (2007) presents two sets of best estimates (one with carbon 
fertilization and one without) as shown in table 6.1 below. 
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TABLE (6.1) AFRICAN AGRICULTURAL DAMAGE ESTIMATES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
REGIONS  
CLINE 
WITHOUT 
CARBON 
FERTILIZAT-
ION 
 
2085 
ESTIMATES 
WITH CARBON  
FERTILIZAT-
ION 
 
 
2085 
ENVISAGE 
WITHOUT 
CARBON 
FERTILIZAT-
ION 
 
2050 
MODEL 
RESULTS WITH 
CARBON 
FERTILIZAT-
ION 
 
2050 
SUB-
SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
-28.1 -17.4 -16.1 -9.9 
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 TABLE (6.2) AGRICULTURAL CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGES: 
COMPARATIVE REAL INCOME IMPACT 
 
$2001 
(BILLION) 
 
PERCENT OF 
BASE LINE 
INCOME 
PERCENT OF 
BASELINE INCOME 
REGIONS 2020     2030 2040       2050 2020 2030 2040 2050 
MIDDLE 
EAST 
AND NORTH 
AFRICA  
-4.5     - 10.0 -20.3     -35.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.8 
SUB—
SAHARAN 
AFRICA 
-5.5       -13.9 -32.7     -71.0 -0.6 -0.9 -1.2 -1.5 
DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
-101.3    -284.8 -703.2  -1508.8 -0.6 -1.0 -1.8 -2.6 
WORLD 
TOTAL 
-125.6    -326.0 -768.7  -1605.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.9 -1.5 
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Empirically, this table provides his estimates (with and without carbon 
fertilization) and therefore represents a weighted average of existing estimates 
using both agro ecological and ricardian methodologies, with a weight (2/3) on 
the ricardian estimate. 
In fact, these estimated damages represent the average change in yields in 2085 
(where it is assumed that the average change in global temperature will be 
2.5oC. 
 Similarly, table 6.2 shows that by 2050, the loss in income from 
incorporating agricultural damages would total over $1.6 trillion ($2001) at the 
global level or 1.5 percent  of total income, of which a very large portion would 
borne by sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa (respectively $710 and  $350 
billion). 
 Consequently, delaying global actions for more than ten years makes 
stabilization at 450ppm CO2 emissions impossible. To achieve this target, 
global  energy-related CO2 emissions will need to peak at 28—32 gigatons in 
2020 from 26  gigatons in 2005 and then  fall to 12-15 gigatons by 2050 . This 
trajectory therefore requires a 2-3 percent cut in emissions for each year as from 
2020 onward. Regrettably, most Africa countries are on their way to a high 
carbon path, with total global CO2 emissions outpacing the worst—case 
scenario as projected by intergovernmental panel on climate change. Thus, new 
additions of power plants, buildings, roads, and railroads over the next decade 
will lock in technology and largely determine emissions through 2050 and 
beyond. Unfortunately, because energy capital stock has a long life, and a 
century to turn over urban infrastructure. 
Therefore, delaying action would substantially increase future mitigation costs; 
effectively locking the continent into carbon-intensive infrastructure for decades 
to come. Even existing low-cost clean energy technologies will take decades to 
fully penetrate the energy sector. And given the long lead times for new 
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technology development, deploying advanced will require today’s aggressive 
action. 
            To avoid such lock—inks, the scale and rate of urbanization present an 
unrivaled opportunity (particularly for Africa countries) to make major 
decisions about building low-carbon cities with compact urban designs, good 
public transport, efficient buildings and clean vehicles. Indeed, one good feature 
of the inertia in energy infrastructure is that introducing efficient low-carbon 
technologies into new infrastructure offers an opportunity to lock in a low-
carbon path. Therefore, Africa countries will install at least half the long lived 
energy capital stocks build between now and 2020. In other words, climate-
smart development policies need to be tailored to the maturity of each 
technology and the national context. This can then accelerate the development 
and development of these technologies. Generally if Africans are to 
meaningfully address climate change, there is no option but to integrate 
development concerns and climate change. Obviously, the climate problem 
arises from the joint evolution of economic growth and greenhouse gas 
emissions.  
Thus, an effective regime must provide the incentives to reconsider trajectories 
of industrialization and unravel the ties that have bound development to carbon. 
Turning this readiness into an effective climate regime requires simultaneously 
addressing multiple goals involving equity, climate as well as social and 
economic development. To ensure a climate regime that speaks to development 
concerns, it is useful to identify and engage opposing perspectives and then seek 
to transcend them. 
To recognize and advance African countries mitigation efforts, the major new 
element needed in the climate regime is a new category of mitigation action that 
is broad and supple enough to incorporate a wide variety of actions. Fortunately, 
many African countries have begun to identify existing and potential policies 
!

and actions at the national level that (while not driven exclusively or primarily 
by climate-change concerns) contribute to climate mitigation efforts. As these 
policies and nations arise within national contexts, they inherently reflect a 
country’s national circumstances as well as its development objectives and 
priorities. But mitigation will be neither effective nor efficient with abatement 
efforts in African countries. 
 Consequently, an equitable approach to limiting global emissions of 
greenhouse gases has to recognize that African countries have legitimate 
development may be jeopardized by climate change; and that they have 
contributed little (historically) to the problem. Thus, flows of climate finance 
(fiscal transfers and market transactions) from Advanced to African countries 
represent the principal way to reconcile equity with effectiveness as well as 
efficiency in dealing with the climate problem. In other words, financial flows 
can help African countries reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to 
the effects of climate change. Yet successfully tackling climate change will cost 
trillions and bearing these costs will be the international community national 
governments, state governments, local governments, firms and households. Yet, 
the principal instrument for catalyzing mitigation in African countries is the 
clean Development mechanism (CDM). This has grown beyond initial 
expatiations, demonstrating the ability of markets to stimulate emission 
reductions, provide essential learning; raise awareness and build capacity. But 
the CDM contains inherent in efficiencies, raising questions about the overall 
process and its efficiency as a financing instrument. Therefore, reversing the 
institutional inertia that constrains climate policy requires fundamental changes 
in interpreting in formation and making decisions. Domestically, a range of 
positive actions can be taken by national and sub national governments s well as 
by the private sector, media and scientific community in Africa. 
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Global and mostly irreversibly, climate change is a matter of cross-country and 
intergenerational distributive justice, affecting the billions of people who will 
live in the rest of this century and beyond. Therefore, the core challenge is to 
consider the policies and strategies that would be good for human development 
overtime; so that improvements exceed those of the past and ensure that 
previously disadvantaged groups are included in future expansions of freedom. 
Certainly, this must be in ways that overcome the limits of carbon-intensive 
growth so that human development is truly sustainable. 
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7.0 CONCLUSION 
 Indeed, African countries have had a relatively good growth performance 
over the past decade. However, there are indications that the current pattern of 
growth in the region may not be sustainable because of the fact that it is based  
on the use of non-renewable (exhaustible) natural resources that contributes to 
global warming and climate change. Although Africa has contributed the least 
to global greenhouse gas emissions, it is estimated that she will be the region 
mostly affected by climate change. In fact, it is estimated that Africa 
agricultural yields will greatly decline while millions of people in Africa will be 
at risk of increased water stress as a result of climate change. 
Therefore, creating sustainable structural transformation in Africa requires 
better access to modern energy sources; improving energy efficiency as well as 
facilitating a switch from non-renewable to renewable energy sources. Thus, the 
policy options for increasing access to modern energy sources include rural 
electrification programmes and economic incentives to lower the relative cost of 
modern energy to households as well as firms in Africa. 
Again, regional cooperation in energy production and distribution is equally 
crucial in enhancing access to modern energy in the region. The target of 
improving energy efficiency and the use of renewable energy can be achieved 
through technology transfer from the developed and emerging economics to 
Africa. Building national capabilities to access use and adapt existing 
technologies remain imperative for the emergence of modern African 
economics. In fact, there is need for African governments to strengthen inter-
ministerial collaboration on environmental issues to ensure that these are 
addressed in a holistic manner by mains teaming of the environment into 
national development strategies. Yet, it is imperative  that developed countries 
should provide financial the energy sector; facilitate technology transfer to 
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support  sustainable structural transformation; design the international trade 
regime as well as intellectual property rights regime in a way that facilitates the 
sustainable development process. 
 Thus, policy instruments need to be coordinated and integrated to 
complement each other and reduce conflicts. Policies, strategies and 
institutional arrangements also have to be aligned across sectors. Cross-sectoral 
initiatives are usually difficult to implement, because of fragmented institutional 
arrangements and weak incentives. Therefore, finding a champion is critical for 
moving the agenda forward. Collaboratively, low-carbon technology and policy 
solutions can put the world onto a 2oC trajectory (but a fundamental 
transformation is needed to decarbonize the energy sector). Indeed, this requires 
immediate action as well as global cooperation and commitment from 
developed and developing countries (including Africa). 
Essentially, there are win-win policies that governments can adopt now, 
including regulatory and institutional reforms; financial incentives and 
financing mechanism to scale up existing low-carbon technologies (particularly 
in the areas of energy efficiency and renewable energy). Clearly, adequate 
carbon pricing and increased technology development are essential to accelerate 
development and deployment of advanced low-carbon technologies. In  other 
word, developed countries must take the lead in demonstrating their 
commitment to significant change at home, while also providing financing and 
low-carbon technologies to development countries (such as Africa). 
Africa countries therefore require paradigm shifts in new climate-smart 
development models. For these transformative changes, the technical and 
economic means exist. But only strong political will and unprecedented global 
cooperation will make them happen. Truly, the time for action is now.                             
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